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The board of directors plays an important role in solving the agency problem between
shareholders and management. This paper investigates the relationships between ownership
and board structure with the diversification strategy of large Japanese firms. The results show
that corporate nominee directors are associated with lower levels of product diversification of
their investee firms. This suggests that nominee directors in large Japanese corporations see
themselves representing specific interests and therefore investors should pay attention to
board composition in order to assess the level of protection they can expect to receive. Even
without any apparent agency problem with management, there remains a potential “principal-
principal” problem.
Keywords: Corporate governance, ownership structure, board of directors, diversification,
Japanese firm
 
Introduction
 
he board of directors plays an important
role in solving the agency problem
between shareholders and management. Prior
studies have examined board characteristics
that uphold the interests of shareholders by
promoting corporate strategies that maximise
shareholder value (Dalton 
 
et al.
 
, 1998). These
studies have been largely based on the Anglo-
American model of corporate governance.
Within the Japanese context the role of the
board in influencing corporate strategy and
performance has been less studied.
 
1
 
 Partly, this
is because Japanese corporate boards, which
comprise mostly executives and former
employees, do not traditionally see them-
selves as active monitors of top management.
Hence, the Japanese board has not been as
active as its American or UK counterparts.
T
 
However, this situation may be changing with
the globalisation of corporate governance
standards.
In this study, we focus on a feature of the
Japanese corporate boardroom that deserves
attention because of its implications for both
theory and practice. Specifically, we examine
the role of the outside directors. There are a
small number of outsider directors on many
Japanese boards who act as representatives of
corporate and banking institutional investors.
Because these institutional shareholders com-
monly have commercial relationships with the
firms to which they appoint nominee direc-
tors, it is likely that such directors represent
the interests of those shareholders.
 
2
 
 In short,
such nominee directors serve to narrow the
conflict of interests between management and
certain classes of shareholders. Here we exam-
ine how Japanese domestic institutional inves-
Published in Corporate Governance, March 2005, Volume 13, Issue 2, pp. 303-312
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tors, who are often business partners or
affiliated firms, influence the corporate strat-
egy of investee firms through the directors
they appoint into the boardroom. Japan pro-
vides an ideal context to study the relation-
ships between ownership structure, nominee
directors and corporate strategy because of the
prevalence of formal and strong inter-firm ties.
 
Literature review
 
Agency theory attempts to address the prob-
lems that arise from the conflict of interests
between parties to a contract in which the
agent has control over the transaction-specific
assets of the principal (Fama, 1980; Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). As residual risk bearers,
shareholders have a right to claim the residual
value
 
3
 
 generated from the firm’s productive
activities. However, management decides how
this residual is disbursed and, because it does
not always own a significant amount of shares,
has little incentive to disburse all back to the
stockholders. To address this 
 
agency problem
 
the corporate governance system incorporates
a variety of monitoring mechanisms, such as
the board of directors and direct action by
large shareholders such as institutions and
wealthy individuals (Fama, 1980; Fama and
Jensen, 1983).
Institutionally, boards of directors owe a
fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the firm
(Monks and Minow, 1995). Thus, it becomes a
matter of theoretical and practical interest to
examine how effective and in what ways
boards have been able to fulfil these duties.
Consequently, a number of studies have inves-
tigated the impact of such factors as board size
(Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Singh
and Harianto, 1989; Zahra and Pearce, 1989;
Goodstein 
 
et al.
 
, 1994; Dalton 
 
et al.
 
, 1999) and
composition (Chaganti 
 
et al.
 
, 1985; Kosnik,
1987; Schellenger 
 
et al.
 
, 1989; Baysinger 
 
et al.
 
,
1991) on corporate strategy and firm perfor-
mance. A number of literature reviews, con-
cluding that evidence on what drives board
effectiveness is mixed (cf. Dalton 
 
et al.
 
, 1998),
recommend that future studies adopt a more
contextually sensitive approach because, for
example, a difference in national context can
limit the applicability of standard agency
theory assumptions of investor risk prefer-
ences, managerial behaviours and board
structures.
In Japan, as in most countries, the board of
directors is legally responsible for the monitor-
ing of the management. However, unlike their
US counterparts, Japanese directors do not
delegate their managerial duties to executive
officers (Heftel, 1983). In part, this is because
board positions are usually conferred to a
firm’s loyal current and former employees and
are thus seen as part of the managerial hier-
archy (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985; Charkham,
1994). Japanese board culture often views
board members as 
 
de facto
 
 managers and thus
subordinate to the CEO. In short, directors are
not expected to question executive manage-
ment in the boardroom.
The few outside directors that serve in the
Japanese corporate governance system are
usually nominees of the banks and corpora-
tions that invest in the firm (Kishida, 1996).
According to the extant literature, such nomi-
nee directors often act as stewards of the com-
mercial, rather than investment, interests of
their institutional investors (Gerlach, 1992).
These “stable” investors are not as driven to
maximise returns on investments as the
“market” investors. This is because the objec-
tives of a commercial relationship and that of
an investment relationship can sometimes
conflict with the costs of protecting the com-
mercial relationship ultimately borne by the
investors. For example, a bank is usually con-
cerned with protecting the quality of its loans,
which translates to higher cash reserve
requirements on the client’s balance sheet. On
the other hand, equity investors want the
excess cash to be returned so they can be rein-
vested more productively (Jensen, 1986).
In short, every strategic objective has a cor-
responding claim on cash flows and the result-
ing conflict between the various interests and
strategic objectives represented by nominee
directors can be incompatible. The strategic
objective that is eventually pursued will
depend on the relative power of these groups
of nominee directors to influence top
management.
For example, bank and corporate share-
holders may not have the same investment
objectives because they have different strate-
gic goals. Bank shareholders are interested in
protecting their loan portfolios while corpo-
rate shareholders want to stabilise supplier–
customer commitments or the strategic
complementarity of their affiliated firms. The
upshot is that different shareholders with dif-
ferent strategic objectives would attempt to
influence where and when managers invest
the firm’s resources. This theoretical frame-
work forms the basis for our research model.
 
Hypotheses
 
Figure 1 illustrates our research model. This is
a two stage temporal model in which we first
hypothesise the effects of ownership and capi-
tal structure on board composition, followed
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by the effects of board composition on diver-
sification strategy. This approach isolates the
effects of ownership and control and board
composition on strategy, which allows us to
examine the relative impact of each variable
and to make conclusions about causality.
 
Effects of ownership and capital structure 
on board composition
 
Japanese shareholders can be broadly classi-
fied into two categories known as “stable
investors”, who are mostly domestic institu-
tions, and “market investors”, who are mostly
foreign institutions (Gerlach, 1992). In 1999,
stable investors such as 
 
keiretsu
 
 firms, main
banks and insurance companies controlled
approximately 38 per cent of the equity in
Japanese firms (NLI Research Institute, 2002).
Conventional thinking suggests that stable
investors own shares as a means to 
 
stabilise
 
commercial relationships rather than to earn
returns on investments (Clark, 1979; Gerlach,
1992). Therefore, when stable investors
appoint outside directors, known as nominee
directors, it is with the objective of protecting
their commercial relationships. Because a
firm’s or a bank’s commercial relationship is
impacted by its cash flows, which are the
result of its business strategies, nominee
directors  can  stabilise  a  firm’s  relationships
by influencing its strategies (Prowse, 1990;
Gerlach, 1992; Kaplan and Minton, 1994). For
example, a number of publicly listed Japanese
firms such as Aiwa and JVC are affiliated with
Sony and Matsushita, respectively. Thus, by
nominating directors to these firms, Sony and
Matsushita can more easily influence the strat-
egies of their affiliated firms. In sum, we
expect to see a relationship between a firm’s
ownership patterns and the structure of the
board, such that:
 
Hypothesis 1a: Corporate ownership is posi-
tively associated with the number of
corporation-nominated directors.
Hypothesis 1b: Bank ownership is positively
associated with the number of bank-nominated
directors.
 
In addition to equity holdings in their cor-
porate partners and clients, banks are also
financially exposed to their clients’ strategic
decisions through the loans they carry. Thus,
the higher the exposure, the greater the incen-
tive for the bank to exert direct influence over
the firms’ strategic objectives, which they can
attempt to do through nominee directors.
Moreover, because a bank’s loan exposure is
typically larger than its equity holdings and
because these loans represent “leveraged” lia-
bilities with corresponding obligations to
depositors, the incentive to protect the down-
side risk is higher than the incentive to maxi-
mise its upside gains from their shareholdings.
Therefore, we would expect a relationship
between a firm’s financial structure and its
board structure such that:
 
Hypothesis 1c: A higher proportion of bank
loans in the firm’s capital structure is positively
associated with the number of bank-nominated
directors.
 
The effects of nominee directors on 
diversification
 
Corporate and bank nominee directors exert
influence on the direction of an investee firm’s
growth strategies according to the interests of
their parent companies and banks, and in pro-
portion to the degree of control they exercise
in the boardroom. Within the portfolio of
available strategies for growth, firms can
choose diversification.
Diversification, or the entry of the firm into
new businesses or product lines not directly
connected to its primary business, is a way to
increase the scope and size of the firm while
at the same time reduce its dependence on the
core business. Diversification can help the firm
lower overall operating risks by creating a
portfolio of businesses with uncorrelated cash
 
Figure 1: The impact of ownership and capital structure on board structure and strategic diversification
in Japanese corporations
Corporate ownership 
Bank ownership 
Bank loan/Liabilities 
Corporate directors 
Bank directors 
Diversification 
+
+
+
–
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flows, i.e. smooth out earnings fluctuations.
However, 
 
ceteris paribus
 
, diversification
requires a firm to reduce the intensity of its
investments in a single business and therefore
may compromise the building of a sustainable
competitive advantage in that business
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Porter, 1985).
Since corporate shareholders have less
direct 
 
financial
 
 exposure to their partner firms,
we expect that they will be more willing to
accept  higher  operating  risks  (i.e.  instability
in cash flows) than bank shareholders, in
exchange for a focused business strategy that
increases the potential for competitive advan-
tage. Therefore, we posit that the pressure for
strategic diversification is lower for corporate
shareholders than it is for bank shareholders.
Further, strategic complementarity, defined as
the coherence of an investee firm’s strategy
with that of the parent’s overall corporate
strategy, is an important consideration for cor-
porate nominee directors. For example, a
parent corporation might find a diversified
affiliate more complicated and costly to man-
age than one that is less diversified. The cor-
poration may also run the risk of a diversified
affiliate cannibalising its product markets if
there are similarities in technology or geo-
graphic scope between the two organisations.
From a strategic perspective, therefore, a cor-
poration would prefer its affiliate to focus on
a defined set of businesses that can add value
to its overall strategic portfolio. In sum, we
expect to find a relationship between board
structure and corporate strategy such that:
 
Hypothesis 2a: The number of corporation-
nominated directors on the board is negatively
associated with diversification.
 
The theory of incomplete contracts holds
that a firm requires predictable cash flows to
discharge its implied and explicit obligations
to lenders, employees, suppliers and custom-
ers in exchange for their willingness to commit
long-term, transaction-specific resources to the
firm. For example, stable employment is
necessary if the firm expects employees to
reduce their investments in general human
capital in favour of firm-specific human capi-
tal. Therefore, from the perspective of the bank
nominee director, stable cash flows are a nec-
essary condition for a bank’s objective of
reducing the default risk of its loan portfolio.
Cash flow stabilisation at the corporate level
can be achieved through strategic diversifica-
tion into other businesses. Thus, we expect to
see a relationship between board structure and
corporate strategy such that:
 
Hypothesis 2b: The number of bank-nominated
directors on the board is positively associated
with diversification.
 
Data and methods
 
Sample and data
 
The sample for this study consists of 228 pub-
licly traded Japanese firms taken from the
population of the 300 largest manufacturing
firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for
the period between 1996 and 1998. Thus, we
have 684 observations for the panel analysis.
We focused on manufacturing sectors to limit
industry level effects and exclude those firms
for which we could not collect complete data
between 1996 and 1998. The Internet boom
and  subsequent  crash  between  1999  and
2001 would have substantively influenced the
investment decisions of Japanese corpora-
tions, which is why we limited our observa-
tions through to 1998. Sample firms are
categorised into one of the following eight
industries; textiles, chemicals, pharmaceutical,
ceramics, steel and metals, machinery, elec-
tronics and automotive. Data for this study
were collected from the following sources:
 
Kaisha Shikiho
 
 (Japan Company Handbook),
 
Yakuin Shikiho
 
 (Board of Director Handbook)
and 
 
Kigyo Keiretsu Soran
 
 (List of Corporate
Keiretsu). These sources are the same ones
used by other researchers and industry ana-
lysts have culled information and they con-
tained the latest financial and organisational
data for the sample firms.
 
Measurement
 
(a) Dependent variables
 
We used two dependent variables in the first
stage of the model: the number of outside
directors nominated by corporations (
 
corporate
directors
 
) and the number of outside directors
nominated by banks (
 
bank directors
 
). Many
studies in corporate governance commonly
use ratios of outside to inside directors,
although there is little consistency on how
these measures are computed (Johnson 
 
et al.
 
,
1996). Since we are trying to measure the
power of 
 
shareholders
 
 over their investee firms,
we chose to use the number of directors as this
reflects the ability of shareholders to get their
nominees appointment to the board. Further-
more, coalition theory suggests that regardless
of total board size, a few individuals with a
common goal can build a coalition that can
exert influence disproportional to their rela-
tive size. Finally, when directors have the
backing of major shareholders such as the cor-
porate parent or main bank, their influence as
a coalition is even greater. The data source for
these variables is 
 
Yakuin Shikiho 
 
(Board of
Director Handbook).
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Diversification
 
 is the dependent variable for
stage two of the model. Following previous
studies on diversification strategy in Japanese
firms (Geringer 
 
et al.
 
, 2000; Lu and Beamish,
2004), we measured diversification with a
Herfindahl index, which is the sums of
squares of sales contribution to total sales by
the individual product groups as classified by
the 
 
Kaisha Shikiho 
 
(Japan Company Hand-
book). Geringer 
 
et al.
 
 (2000) calculated a simi-
lar diversification measure from the 
 
Kaisha
Shikiho
 
 data. This measure of diversification
differs from those using Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes in the US because it
measures diversity at the product rather than
business level. Our measure is finer grained
because it differentiates between different
product lines in a single business that an SIC
based measure would not ordinarily detect
because many businesses have multiple prod-
ucts within an industrial class. Therefore, we
expect more variance in our measure relative
to other measures using standard SIC codes.
 
(b) Independent variables
 
There are three independent variables in the
first stage of the model: corporate ownership,
bank ownership and bank debt. 
 
Corporate
ownership
 
 is measured as the ratio of the total
number of shares held by non-financial
corporations to total outstanding common
shares. Similarly, 
 
bank ownership
 
 is measured
as the ratio of number of shares owned by
banks to total outstanding common shares.
 
Bank debt
 
 is the proportion of bank loans to
total liabilities. A higher ratio indicates a
heavier reliance on bank loans for debt finan-
cing, and thus more exposure to the influence
of bank nominated directors.
At the second stage of the model, we
included 
 
board composition
 
 as the numbers of
nominee corporate directors and nominee
bank directors. This is the same measure we
used for the dependent variables in the first
stage of the model.
 
(c) Control variables
 
In this study, we used four control variables.
 
Foreign ownership
 
 is the ratio of shares owned
by foreign investors to total outstanding
shares. This variable indicates the degree to
which a firm is exposed to pressures from
market-oriented investors and is therefore less
free to respond to the strategic interests of
domestic stable investors. Since most foreign
shareholders  are  arm’s-length  investors
with  no  on-going  business  ties,  we  expect
that their greater holdings will lead the firm
and its directors to respond with efficiency-
maximising resource allocation policies.
The log of 
 
sales
 
 controlled for the effects of
economies of scale and scope. 
 
Debt ratio
 
 was
included to control for the effects of debt
financing. In a fixed effects model, one does
not include variables such as “industry” that
are independent of time. In an approach sug-
gested by Dess 
 
et al.
 
 (1990), we accounted for
the systematic impact of industry effects by
using an industry mean value of Tobin’s Q
(Industry Q) based on the categorisation pro-
vided by the
 
 Kaisha Shikiho
 
.
 
Data analysis
 
To test our hypotheses, we report the results
of the panel analysis using fixed effects
General Least Squares (GLS) regression for the
1996–1998 dataset. A Hausman Test suggests
that  a  fixed-effects  model  is  preferred  over
a random-effects model because the null
hypotheses for both models were rejected, i.e.
the random effects estimator is biased
(Kennedy, 1998, pp. 305–307). Hence, we used
the fixed-effects model.
Table 1 reports the Pearson correlations of
the variables. It shows that the number of
nominee corporate directors is positively cor-
related with corporate ownership and nega-
tively correlated with bank ownership. The
number of nominee bank directors was nega-
tively correlated with corporate ownership
but positively corrected with bank loans.
There was no relationship between bank own-
ership and the number of bank nominee direc-
tors, which seems to suggest that banks with
greater loan exposure are more likely to seek
the appointment of directors. Finally, we note
that the number of corporate nominees is
negatively correlated to the number of bank
nominee directors, suggesting a limit to the
size of the board. Overall, the picture suggests
that bank and corporate nominee directors
play different roles in the boardroom.
 
Results
 
Table 2 reports on part one of the panel data
analysis. As seen from this table, corporate
ownership is strongly and positively associ-
ated with the number of nominee corporate
directors, supporting Hypothesis 1a. Corpo-
rate ownership is negatively related to the
number of bank nominee directors, suggesting
that corporate owners are able to exert their
claims to the exclusion of the bankers if their
ownership stakes are high. The result also
hints at the possibility that bank and corporate
nominees have opposing interests.
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Bank ownership is not related to the number
of nominee bank directors, rejecting Hypoth-
esis 1b. We also do not find a statistically signi-
ficant positive association between the bank
loan ratio and the number of nominee bank
directors, thus there is no support for Hypoth-
esis 1c. Overall, we find that the part of the
model related to bank directors is not sup-
ported by the data. The variance explained is
small and more importantly, the regression
model is not statistically significant.
We find an unexpected positive relationship
between bank ownership and corporate
director and a negative relationship between
corporate ownership and bank director. This
finding will be explored in greater depth in the
discussion.
Table 3 reports the second part of the panel
data analysis. It shows that the number of cor-
porate directors and diversification strategy
are negatively associated, which provides sup-
port for hypothesis 2a. However, we do not
find any relationship between the number of
bank directors and diversification strategy,
rejecting Hypothesis 2b. The results also
report that corporate director accounted for an
additional 2 per cent of variance explained,
which is significant, given that the model is
constrained with only 3 per cent of variance
explained by the control variables. In terms of
the control variables, Industry Q is negatively
associated with diversification implying that
industries populated by more diversified
firms are less profitable.
 
Discussion and conclusions
 
Overall, we found that the data provided sup-
port for about half the research model. We
argued that Japanese institutional investors
are able to exert their strategic preferences in
the boardroom through nominee director
appointments. In some ways, our approach is
classic agency theory because it assumes that
directors act to represent the interests of those
investors  who  appoint  them.  However,  as
part of a growing stream of research (e.g.
Gedajlovic 
 
et al.
 
, 2005; Thomsen and Pedersen,
2000), our approach moves us away from the
standard agency theory treatment of share-
holders as either atomistic investors with no
influence over management or concentrated
investors who coordinate their actions to max-
imise shareholder value. We attempted to
show that Japanese outside directors serve
their parent or affiliated institutional share-
holders whose interests are not always to
maximise their equity investment returns. In
this study, we recognise that directors, when
confronted with an identifiable shareholder
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constituency, will likely act to advance that
group’s narrow interests.
We found that Japanese corporate owner-
ship is positively related to the number of
nominee corporate directors and, not unex-
pectedly, negatively associated with the num-
ber of nominee bank directors. This result
seems to strengthen the argument that share-
holders attempt to exert influence in the
boardroom through the nomination of direc-
tors who can represent their interests. This
conclusion is further strengthened by the find-
ing that corporate directors preferred less
strategic diversification, and instead focused
the firm’s resources toward core business
activities.
We found a puzzling positive correlation
between Japanese bank ownership and the
number of corporate directors. However, the
effect size is only about 20 per cent of the re-
lationship between bank ownership and cor-
porate directors. We note that the correlation
table (Table 1) reports a positive correlation
between debt and bank directors, which is in
line with our research model. It turns out that
those firms with corporate nominees are usu-
ally affiliated with corporate groups or are
subsidiaries of larger parents. This finding
deserves further research, but we can specu-
late that banks may be viewing these affilia-
tions as implicit hedges against loan risks,
since the hub firms of Japanese business
groups or 
 
keiretsu
 
 have traditionally bailed out
affiliates that run into financial difficulties
(Sheard, 1994).
We did not find any relationship between
the number of bank nominee directors and
diversification. A possible reason is that Japa-
nese firms performed poorly in the late 1990s
because of a prolonged domestic recession
 
Table 2: Results of fixed effects panel analysis of ownership structure on nominee directors
 
Corporate director Bank director
Beta T-value Beta T-value
Debt ratio
 
-
 
0.008
 
-
 
1.16
 
-
 
0.010
 
-
 
1.43
Foreign ownership 0.007 0.94
 
-
 
0.017
 
-
 
2.30*
Log sales (size) 1.334 4.04‡ 0.050 0.16
Industry Q
 
-
 
0.032
 
-
 
0.21 0.054 0.38
Corporate ownership 0.105 9.88‡
 
-
 
0.021
 
-
 
2.04*
Bank ownership 0.021 3.21†
 
-0.003 -0.46
Bank loan 0.001 0.33 0.004 1.55
R2 = 0.23; F = 18.97‡; 
Obs = 684
R2 = 0.02; F = 1.62; 
Obs = 684
‡p < 0.001, †p < 0.010, *p < 0.050.
Table 3: Results of fixed effects panel analysis of nominee directors on diversification
Diversification
Beta T-value Beta T-value
Debt ratio -0.022 -0.36 -0.035 -0.58
Log sales (size) -7.511 -2.63† -5.291 -1.82
Foreign ownership -0.068 -1.01 -0.083 -1.23
Industry Q -3.632 -2.87† -3.380 -2.69*
Corporate director -1.207 -3.20†
Bank director -0.183 -0.42
R2 = 0.03; F = 3.67†; 
Obs = 684
R2 = 0.05; F = 4.21†; 
Obs = 684
†p < 0.010, *p < 0.050.
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lasting almost 10 years. Many Japanese firms
did not have sufficient cash flow to engage in
meaningful diversification and thus Japanese
firms under the control of the banks did not
have the resources to increase the level of
diversification even if they had the intentions
to do so.
Finally, we note that the data did not pro-
vide any support for the relationship between
bank ownership and bank nominee directors
in Japan. In hindsight, this may be attributed
to the fact that Japanese banks tend to send
directors to their investee firms only during
periods of financial distress (Sheard, 1994).
Such “rescue” operations do not result in a
permanent appointment of such directors and
are usually reversed when the situation has
been stabilised. Therefore, although a bank
may have ownership, these equity risks are
small relative to their debt exposures, the lat-
ter of which are likely to be secured by collat-
erals and legal covenants that work to
attenuate the need for ongoing representation
in the boardroom. Further, the globalisation of
the capital market, and declining ability of the
Japanese banks to rescue troubled client com-
panies have made the commercial banking
relationship more arm’s length and less rela-
tional, with the result that banks may have
become less inclined to be involved with their
client firms’ management.
Overall, our model seems to suggest that
Japanese corporations holding equity in other
firms are just as interested in efficiency, from
the standpoint of strategic diversification, in
the use of resources as other financially driven
investors. The difference is that they have the
ability to nominate directors that have a direct
influence on their investee firms’ strategies.
This study also suggests that we have to pay
particular attention to the institutional context
in which investors make their decisions. We
show that the identity of the investor is an
important consideration for future studies
because bank and corporate owners in Japan
seem to have different preferences for board
composition and strategy choice.
On a practical level, this study suggests that
because nominee directors in large Japanese
corporations see themselves representing
specific interests, investors would be wise to
pay attention to the composition of the board
in order to assess the level of protection they
can  expect  to  receive  as  owners.  Even  with-
out any apparent agency problem between
management and shareholders, there remains
a potential “principal-principal” or share-
holders’ conflicts of interest problem. These
conflicts can lead to the inefficient allocation
of resources. This is particularly true of com-
panies in Japan and other countries (e.g. con-
tinental Europe and Asia) where dominant
shareholders are common.
Finally, we note a couple of interesting
opportunities for future research. First, it
would be instructive to document whether
minority shareholders care about the presence
of nominee directors in the Japanese board-
room. Increasingly, these minority share-
holders are  foreign  institutional  investors
such as CalPers (California Public Employees
Retirement System) and major fund manage-
ment companies. The relationship between
these foreign investors are more likely to be
arm’s length rather than relational. Thus, we
would expect the increase in minority owner-
ship to result in a systematic discount, equal
to the potential for expropriation by nominee
directors that represent majority interests, of
the share price.
We can also expand the categories of insti-
tutional investors, for example by sub-
classifying “market investors” into “retail”,
“mutual”, “insurance”, “pension” and so on,
to assess the impact of investment horizon on
strategy preferences. Standard CAPM theory
says that the relationship between risk/return
preferences should be reflected in the stock
portfolio that investors choose. However,
large Japanese and foreign corporate investors
that have commercial relationships with their
investee firms cannot exercise those choices
freely because the movement of large blocks
of shares will affect the value of the company.
Thus, these investors may be forced to exercise
their strategic preferences by direct action in
the boardroom so that a Japanese firm’s strat-
egy may be the result of board composition
rather than that of a rationally driven eco-
nomic decision-making process.
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Notes
1. Exceptions include Suzuki and Sho (2000).
2. Similar situations exist in other parts of the
world. In Germany, for example, the Aufsichsrat
or supervisory board is not chosen for its strict
commitment to shareholder interests. Instead,
bankers, unions and affiliate firms often have an
influence through their director appointments.
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3. Defined, according to Jensen (1986), as free cash
flow or the cash from operations and invest-
ments net of contractual obligations and future
projects with positive net present values.
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